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. ure Technology, and The Human Good: 
~e• ote' on the Human Roots of Political Reform 
pcr£R A UGUST) E LAWLER 
Berry College 
Why is leisure good for human beings? This question is extraordinarily 
difficult to answer coherently within the context of a democratic, 
technology-dependent r~gime. Nevertheless, it is one we are compelled to 
onfront throughtfully 1f we are to lead purposeful or "complete" human 
live . If we cannot convince the world of the significance of our thoughtful 
an wer to this fundamental question, it is a sign of our freedom or potential 
for " elf-determination" that we can move beyond the general limits of our 
(ime and place in transforming our own, particular lives. With this conclu-
ion both the followers of Jesus and the followers of Socrates agree. 
We must begin by remembering that ours is a world in large part defined 
by technology. If we define technology as the use of the energy liberated 
and controlled by the methodical use of human intelligence to maximize the 
comfortable self-preservation of the great mass of human beings, then we 
an agree that what appear to be our two great economic and political alter-
natives-capitalism and socialism-are both essentially technological in 
pirit. The genuine debate between capitalism and socialism is largely con-
ducted within the "economic" perspective of determining which system 
provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number, when happiness is 
materialistically understood. Perhaps, in principle, there is no real dif-
ference between East and West. Both are linked together as "European" 
proponents of the technological spirit of the modern scientific and 
philosophic project. 
Human beings must regard technology as a means to an end. The argu-
ment for the primacy of technological or visible and tangible success in 
moral and political calculations is that such success is an indispensable 
precondition for all those things human beings regard as good. Even 
t. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas can agree with the rest of us that 
self-preservation and comfort are real goods to beings with bodies. Certainly 
this understanding of the human good is not exhaustive, but beyond it 
agreement is not possible. Given our fallibility and our obstinacy, attempts 
to define a more comprehensive understanding of a common good lead to 
always potentially violent quarrels. Such quarrels, of course, can cause us to 
forget our common dependence on the products of technology for our pur-
suit of any good. We can disagree on the answers to the "classical" ques-
tions concerning the nature of the soul and of human excellence-and we 
will, given our propensity to identify "human" excellence with "one's 
own" excellence-and still agree to contain our disagreements in a way 
which prevents the "illusions" of pride from overwhelming our candid 
acknowledgement of the implications of our common fears. We define our 
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own good in any way we please which does not obstruct the effec tual Pu . 
suit of the agreed-upon common good, and we cannot do this without Pe~-
mitting everyone else to do the same. 
In this light, it would be easy to conclude that the purpose or 
technology is the production of leisure. Overcoming with a co ntinuau 
growing effectiveness the constraints of bodily necessity, techno logy Pr; 
vides us with ever-expanding horizons of "free time." The nece sar 
amount of individual toil is constantly decreasing, and we are living longe~ 
and more comfortably. Freed from fear, hunger, and even the necessity of 
giving birth, each of us can devote our time to our own particu lar form or 
"self-actualization."' 
But there are reasons for questioning the view that technology can Pro-
duce leisure. Leisure, properly speaking, has almost always been 
understood as an aristocratic phenomenon. An aristocrat is some one who 
understands himself as not essentially "body" but as "soul." He decisively 
rejects the visible and tangible evidence that he cannot be distinguished 
from the rest of nature because, like the rest of nature, he is essentially a 
body which comes into being and passes away. He denies that he is essen-
tially limited by his mortality. He conquers his body's fear of death through 
his soul's angry pride. He takes pleasure in his consciousness of his par-
ticular human excellence, and he tends to forget his dependence on his own 
body, other human beings, and his "environment. " 2 
For an aristocrat, all technological activity is for slaves, that is, those 
who are compelled by some necessity to be slavishly concerned with their 
own material well-being. The aristocrat loves his own idleness above all, 
which is really the serene contemplation of his own self-suffic ient ex-
cellence. All is well with him; he is in need of nothing . Although he is never 
"productive," he is not always purposeless or motionless. 1 He engages in 
"beautiful and useless" activities, which are good for their own sa ke and 
timeless in their meaning. They are leisurely in their freedom fro m necessity, 
and his performance of them is a manifestation of his freedom .• 
Leisure might be defined, in the aristocrat's eyes, as conscio usness of 
one's freedom and forgetfulness of one's dependence on one's own body, 
other human beings, and one's environment. It is redundant to add that ii 
includes a lack of consciousness of the necessary constraints of time . Its 
"completeness" essentially precludes its presence "in time." i Leisurely ac-
tivity must be at least akin to the activity of the gods. 6 
As Aristotle shows, the aristocrat must somehow possess the courage 
of the warrior (Achilles) and the self-consciousness of the philosopher 
(Socrates). Aristotle's description of the magnanimous man, whic h may be 
best viewed as a profound effort to "make sense" of what is suggest ed by 
Plato's portrayal of Socrates as the new Achilles in the Apology, might be 
called a synthesis of the warrior's courage and the philosopher's eras and 
logos.' The warrior who does not philosophize or give a logos of his own ac-
tivity is not really self-sufficient; he cannot satisfy his erotic longing 
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ugh his courage alone. He is dependent on the "honor" of others for 
t:ro/ogos describing the human worth of his courageous deeds. Hence he is 
L eJaved to public opinion, a public composed of those whom he regards as 
e~s inferiors and hence incapable of recognizing him for what he is. 
his Despite its manifest insufficiency, the warrior who is not a philosopher 
has no choice bu~ to enslave hims~lf to the unleisurely activities related ~o 
ar to manifest his excellence publicly, and he really cannot take pleasure m 
:e self-sufficifmcy of leisurely self-contemplation. Even that form of con-
~ict most akin to peace, political action, is unleisurely because it cannot be 
nderstood as choiceworthy for its own sake. 8 It is action on behalf of a 
u articular "regime" or ideal, and the warrior who is not a philosopher can-
~ot even show that the ideal for which he fights is truly choiceworthy. 
If the warrior needs the philosopher's self-consciousness, the 
philosopher needs the warrior's courage. The philosopher asserts that the 
pursuit of knowledge is choiceworthy for its own sake and the foundation 
of a way of life worthy of human beings. Like the warrior, he asserts that he 
i , and deserves to be, free from bodily necessity. He, too, defines himself 
according, to this "soul." In order to show that his assertions are not merely 
illusions or rationalizations but something real, he must show that he, too, 
can face death fearlessly. 
A complete account of the philosopher's freedom from bodily necessity 
no doubt would include a large place for the warrior's spirited self-
overcoming. He, however, emphasizes the distinction between the origin of 
his freedom and that of the warrior's. The warrior's courage is fanatic 
because he believes he knows that death is terrible; he believes he must be 
willfully unreasonable to assert his humanity. The root of his assertion is 
unbounded anger at the terrible truth of time; it is his revenge against time. 9 
The philosopher realizes he really knows nothing of death. He also 
knows it is irrational to oppose what is beyond his thought and power. He 
faces death thoughtfully and openly as an occasion for the greatest curiosity 
and as an experience that simply canriot be avoided. He knows it is foolish 
to risk his life gratuitiously, but he is willing to see his life end when the time 
has come. As Socrates showed, moreover, he is, if necessary, willing to risk 
his life to defend his freedom. 
The philosopher asserts that his own life, thought admittedly tem-
porary, is good. He agrees with those who criticize the warrior's perspective 
by holding that it is impossible to show that human life is good if pleasure is 
not a human good. He argues that his characteristic activity is pleasurable, 
but its pleasure is "of the soul." 10 It exists essentially apart from the body 
and time and is a genuine manifestation of human excellence. 
He calls his activity "contemplation," which he identifies as the activity 
of the gods. What else would gods do, who have neither bodily desires nor 
social or political responsibilities? Surely they would not have the concern 
with power and will of self-conscious and contingent beings. 11 Contempla-
tion includes or perhaps is even primarily self-contemplation; in its purely 
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divine form, it is "thought thinking itself," and it is sti ll "v 
pleasurable." 12 The philosopher imitates divinity when he sees him elty 
e_ssentially thought a~~ knows that he is good. He tr~nscends the per Pe: 
t1ve of moral and pohucal concern, and he has no desire to use his though 
to produce power to change the world. He, like the gods, is radical! 1 
untechnological, and he is at leisure . He is the real aristocrat. Y 
Aristotle justifies the goodness of philosophy on the aristocra t 's 0 "' 
terms : excellence, self-sufficiency, freedom, leisure and so fort h. He doen 
so, in part, to defend theoretically the possibility that aristocratic st riving i: 
not in vain. The aristocrat, in principle, can reasonably hope to enjoy in 
leisurely tranquillity the con ciousness of his excellence. He can do so 
however, only by seeing the limits of and transcending mora lity anct 
politics; moral virtue and political activity are too close to bodily desire and 
too unleisurely in their "other directedness" to be genuinely aristoc ratic. ,1 
The "city" is part of the "external equipment" required for indi vidual 
excellence .•• 
The individual really depends on political order and techno log ical pro _ 
perity for his excellence, but he cannot be too concerned with these need if 
he is to be truly excellent. Such matters are too intimately connec ted with 
the body to be of central human concern. Excellence is "proud" and hence 
technologically "sterile." " It is best to consider the precondit ions of ex-
cellence as the products of "chance" and not to delude oneself slavi hly by 
believing that they can be willed into existence by reason . 16 
The aristocratic philosopher holds that to liberate technology from it 
subordination to some aristocratic perspective would destroy humanity. ,. 
In one sense, our environmental and nuclear crises have shown tha t he has 
not yet been proven incorrect. In another sense, in which he has al o not 
been proven incorrect, he meant that the liberation of technology would be 
the cause of humanity's self-brutalization in the pursuit of a free dom from 
necessity that is impossible to obtain. This is why he chose to ca ll human be-
ings godlike not by virtue of their power, but by virtue of their thou ght. He 
points to a "complete life" that is really possible for human bei ngs, and he 
shows us why it is unreasonable to dwell on the necessity of its eventual 
cessation. 11 
Consider that a "liberal education" is good for its own sake because it 
gives the most genuine satisfaction to our "aristocratic" desires . Its critic 
say that it causes us to forget about our bodies, yet it does not rea lly con-
quer human contingency or eliminate our dependence on and hence our in-
debtedness to other human beings. It obstinately and uncharita bly refu es 
to prove its real worth. The aristocratic response to this criticism is that the 
real endurance of the philosophic interpretation of human exce llence over 
time can be traced to its proud assertion of the immortality and autonom y 
of the soul. 20 It is Socrates' prideful reinterpretation of aristocrat ic virtue a 
self-consciousness and not the self-conscious hedonism of the phi losophical 
materialists that is "the vortex and turning point of Western civiliz ation . '' 2' 
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We admire, and remember, above all, Socrates' warrior-like risk of life in 
bat with Athens and the leisurely way he met death. Logos may well be 
coJTJthless unless it can show the nobility of the human soul. The stock ob-
wor · h ·11 · f h · h 
. tion to the aristocrat, owever, st1 retains some orce; t e assertion t at 
~~~ soul does not depend on the bo~y contains a strong elem~nt ~f illusion 
obfuscation. It has the practical effect of underestimating what 
orchnology can accomplish in the service of human freedom. 22 
te The technological view of the world stands in stark opposition to that 
f the aristocrat's. The partisan of technology accepts only visible and 
0
angible evidence, and hence he denies the artistocrat's assertion that he has 
1 
eallY become something other than body through 'his own efforts. He holds 
:ve can only understand humanity in terms of what human beings have really 
made; humanity is nothing more than its concrete achievements or history . 
He denies that anything human is truly timeless, and he holds that God or 
the gods are a creation of illusory human pride. He is obsessed with time 
and with controlling the future. He knows there is no genuine appeal 
beyond historical or technological success, and he knows that victory is 
always associated with physical power. 23 Hence for him there is no leisure. 
There is no escape from the pull of natural necessity, and there is no support 
in nature for proud assertions of human particularity. Human beings will 
never have enough power to achieve genuinely what they genuinely 
de ire-to be freed from the fact of their absolutely contingent existence in 
an infinite universe. They are compelled to conquer a hostile environment, 
and they can achieve remarkable success. But human victories can never be 
definitive. Life is ceaseless motion in pursuit of an impossible goal. 2• 
The partisan of technology's identification of humanity with effective 
work reflects, then, a candid recognition of the consequences of human 
mortality . It is indebted in a fundamental way to the Christian judgment 
concerning "this worldly" existence. Human beings cannot find a genuine 
home here because its attachments and satisfactions do not do real justice to 
the deepest human longings. Consider the following telling remark by Pope 
John Paul II, which is found in the midst of a message articulating the 
human dignity of proper work: 
There is yet another aspect of human work, an essential dimension of 
other, that is profoundly imbued with the spirituality based on the 
Gospel. All work, whether manual or intellectual, is inevitably linked 
with toil. The Book of Genesis expresses it in a truly penetrating man-
ner: the original blessing of work contained in the very mystery of crea-
tion and connected with man's elevation as the image of God is con-
trasted with the cur.se that sin brought with it. "Cursed is the ground 
because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life." This 
toil connected with work marks the way of human life on earth and 
constitutes an announcement of death .... (Laborem Exercens, Sec-
tion 27) 
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For Christians, the necessity of toil, consciousness of time, and the . 
evitability of death casts a shadow over every hum an activt· 
"Aristocratic" leisure is simply prideful self-deception; it is a fundament~r-
fraudulent attempt to e cape what appear to be the ultimate consequenc Y 
of one's own embodiment. 25 In genuinely Christian communiti es, such es 
the Benedictine abbey, the aristocratic distinction between free leisure a~ 
servile work disappeared. 26 Work was sanctified a a way of ack nowledgt 
one's enslavement to bodily nece sity and one's inability to free one ~~ 
from this enslavement through one's own efforts. 
Yet there is also an activity which might be called Christia n leisure. Th 
Benedictine monks were not only workers but thinkers. Like th: 
"aristocratic" philosophers, they held that contemplation was good for its 
own sake. Unlike the aristocrat, however, they held that genui nely leisurely 
activity is available not only to a privileged or gifted few, but to all human 
beings. Knowledge of God is literally self-evident through rea on, reveJa. 
tion, and conscience. Thoughts of what is genuinely eternal and of the 
promise of one's own personal immortality make it possib le to bear the 
necessities of this life with genuine happiness. God grants freely to the 
Christian that of which the aristocrat can only achieve a semblance in 
moments of profound self-delusion. Humble acknowledgme nt of one' 
dependence and "hope in things unseen" replace prideful consci ousnes of 
one's own self-sufficient excellence as the foundation of persona l erenity 
and hence genuine leisure. 21 The Christian can philosophize without being a 
warrior. 
To understand our technological view of the world which came into be-
ing with the audacious founding of modern political philos ophy and 
modern science by Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, an d others, it is 
not too misleading to imagine the Christian critique of aristocra t ic leisure in 
the name of candid self-analysis combined with a dogmatic, at heistic rejec-
tion of the possibility of any form of salvation through supernat ural mean . 
The result, as we have ·seen, is the view that all human beings are compelled 
to labor continuously to satifsy materialistic desire. Aristocrati c pride i 
subordinated to democratic fear; "theory" is formulated in ter ms of what i 
required for successful practice (the production of power, the liberation of 
energy). 21 
For the partisan of technology, leisure, strictly speaking, doe s not ex-
ist, because we can only know what we make. To cease to work is to lose our 
humanity, which is the product of our dissatisfaction with our mortality . 
Moments without labor are not filled with self-contentmen t, but with 
"boredom, restlessness, and anxiety. " 29 To be freed from thoughtles 
materialism is freedom for the nihilistic realization that we do not know 
that there is anything but thoughtless matter and arbitrary human will.1' 
The resulting "uneasiness" 3 ' sends us immediately back to wor k. Leisure i 
something from which we escape, because we are unable to lose ourselve in 
aristocratic or Christian dreams which would make it seem wort hwhile. We 
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nnot escape from our consciousness of time; we identify being with time. 
rven our vacations are filled with constant motion from place to place and 
••recreational" activity and not genuine release from the rigors of 
chnological striving. 32 Even our religion is progressively becoming a 
:;theology of liberation," in which we understand "the Kingdom of God" 
0 be a project to be realized through human labor, a project we know will 1 
ever really be fulfilled because we know that no political or social reform :ill satisfy the whole of human desire. The atheism implicit in modern 
cience has long been in the process of destroying the supernatural and 
aristocratic components of our inherited beliefs. 33 One of these beliefs is the 
goodness of leisure for human beings. 
It still offends reason to say anything other than the goal of technology 
i leisure. We can still say that its purpose is to satisfy bodily need. Once 
chese needs are satisfied, then leisure is possible. The realm of necessity 
gives way to the realm of freedom, not just in the "alienated" imaginations 
of the few, but "in reality" for everyone. We aim at the radical freedom 
which Socrates associated with genuine democracy, the regime defined by 
che absence of any compulsion and under which every "leisurely" activity is 
available at all times to every human being. 34 This is also what is described 
0 lyrically as socialism by Marx in The German Ideology. 
But we also have reason to believe that technology will never achieve its 
goal. The goal of technology is to eradicate fear and pain: to really conquer 
human mortality and contingency by dealing with the body on its own 
1erms. This goal simply cannot be achieved by human beings. The more suc-
ce sful we appear to be in achieving it through our growing power, the more 
it eludes us. The more preoccupied we become with technological success, 
the more fearful we become. If we managed to eliminate human death as a 
necessity (which Bacon and Descartes recognized as the central goal of 
modern science), we would still not be able to eradicate it as a possibility, 
because we cannot eliminate all contingency from the infinite universe. 
Hence fear would increase immeasurably; death and courage would lose their 
meaning as constituent parts of the human condition. We can risk our 
necessarily "finite" lives for something we believe of "infinite" worth-a 
friend, our family, a principle, and even our reputation. But when life is no 
longer finite, our calculations change radically. i, They would be based on 
fear and nothing else, because death would be understood as the indefinitely 
avoidable evil. We would all live in lead houses and never venture outside. 
We would certainly have no leisure. The more successful and prosperous we 
materialists become, the more unhappy we are. 36 We are "really" no more 
successful in conquering death than aristocrats and Christians, but we 
deprive ourselves of what we call their illusions which give their lives what 
they call human meaning. 
According to the technological view of human affairs, we know our 
own death to be ultimate evil, and the purpose of reason is to calculate how 
best to avoid this evil. Yet our insatiable desire for the absolutely secure 
IOI 
possession of our life undermines our satisfaction with it. We ca nnot enj 
our present health if we dwell on its contingent and temporary nature. l'~y 
same can be said of our property, friendships, and loves. Whe n we defi/ 
reason solely in terms of what is required for bodily need, the n we cannoe 
rest until we achieve the impossible. The "existentialist" artic ulates th t 
foundation of this technological view by defining humanity as simply con~ 
sciousness of this lack of definitive satisfaction. The technologic al and ex. 
istentiali t ways of under tanding humanity with reference to the inevitability 
of death are fundamentally misanthropic in denying the possi bility of ge. 
nuinely human leisure. 37 
We can conclude that the typical resident of a democratic 
technologically-oriented society is in constant motion in pursuit of wealth 
and power to increase his "well-being." As we have just seen, this motion 
from one perspective, never ceases because it is never possible to ever hav; 
enough well-being if one understands it materialistically. This perspective 
however, is not complete if it is thought to be circumscribed sim ply by fear'. 
Because even the single-minded partisan of technology is st ill a human 
being, he cannot be understood as being without pride, without the 
"aristocratic" desire for consciousness of his own self-sufficent excellence, 
although the power of this desire varies greatly from human being to human 
being. Because he is a partisan of "applied" science, he requires visible and 
tangible evidence of the truth of his opinions about even himse lf. Con e-
quently, he desires to have as much wealth and power as he can ac-
quire-certainly more than any other human being-in order to prove his 
superiority or excellence. 
A consistent aristocrat would say that this prideful mate rialist or 
"capitalist entrepreneur" accumulates matter to gain quantitative evidence 
of his human qualities and hence that his self-understanding is mo nstrously 
incoherent because it is vulgarly reductionistic. He is willing to take any 
risk, even "heroically" risk his life, in pursuit of merely "econom ic" goals, 
those which can be traced ultimately to the body's fear and not the soul's 
pride. 38 His avidly "competitive" pursuit of wealth can be criticize d by the 
Christian as selfishness run rampant, but the aristocrat would cr it icize it as 
a manifestation of his insufficent appreciation of himself. It is a sign of an 
inability to regard oneself as a human being and hence of a lack of genuine 
self-sufficiency. 19 No attempt to define human excellence in terms of quan-
tities can ever provide the foundation for the tranquil stability which is the 
precondition for genuine leisure. From the perspective of the pa rtisan of 
leisure, the illusions of the consistent aristocrat are infinitely pref erable to 
the illusions of the entrepreneur. 
It is now commonplace to say that we long for illusions. We envy tho e 
who can be genuinely proud or pious. We want to escape from the 
homogeneou materialism of our time which democratically defines all 
things, including the human things, in terms of limitless quantities and to a 
"horizon" which limits by distinctively defining the human pers pective.• • 
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8 cause we have not purged ourselves of our pride, however, and perhaps 
e cannot because we are not really free to will the soul out of existence, but 
we . . . 
erely distort 1t m monstrous ways, we caanot embrace a "horizon" we 
:now merely to be a "horizon," a "value-system" we know merely to be a 
,, alue-system." We are proud of the "will to truth" which constitutes the 
dynamic of our tradition and is the source of our critical situation. Conse-
uently , we take a certain Socratic pride in affirming theoretical conclu-
qions which deny the existence of human distinctiveness and show that we 
are no better than brutes.• • We even understand ourselves to be superior to 
ocrates in that we are too self-conscious to take any pleasure in our con-
ciousness of ourselves. •2 We are proud of our inability to enjoy our 
moments of " free time." 
Becau se we-perhaps dogmatically-eschew "salvation" by 
aristocrat ic or Christian means, we are compelled to seek relief from our 
mi ery within the context of the homogeneous materialism on which the 
technological view of the world is based . If self-consciousness is our prob-
lem, as Rou sseau first recognized, then homogeneous materialism really 
does suggest a solution. If humanity really cannot be distinguished from the 
rest of nature, if there is really no cosmic support for our humanity, then we 
are mistaken to define ourselves with reference to our particular self-
con ciousness. Perhaps self-consciousness and its byproducts-such as 
reason, fear , and pride-can be understood as accidental, unfortunate and 
inessential acquisitions of some evolutionary or historical process and not 
a part of our genuine being . If we are true to ourselves, then we reject the 
"unnatural " unhappiness produced by our unnecessary desires. Surely the 
modern, technological, "bourgeois" preoccupation with time and mortality 
i not healthy or "life-enhancing" and probably not even really conducive 
to mere self-preservation. It could only be viewed as natural if one deviates 
from a wholly consistent materialism, and the partisan of technology knows 
there is no unproblematic method for accounting for such deviations. 
If our humanity prevents us from being genuinely happy or content 
and there is no cosmic support for our "godlike" pretensions, then we can 
only be happy by "forgetting" our humanity and lapsing into animality. 
The most significant discovery of the technological view of the world is 
there is no such thing as human happiness. Stripping away our "historical" 
acquisition of reason or self-consciousness and the insatiable desires it 
generates, we find that our natural state of being is a simple and sweet senti-
ment of existence. 
This feeling, in its way, is god like in its self-sufficiency. Its "reveries" 
take us away from awareness of our neediness. It allows us to be wholly idle 
without guilt. We may still desire to engage in activities, but only those 
which require no mental or bodily exertion and the significance of which we 
do not feel compelled to give an account. We can only be wholly content 
with what we are when we are only aware of our "feelings" at the present 
moment . Time has disappeared, and we are, in a way, at leisure. 
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We are only conscious enough to affirm simply the goodness of lit 
We have no "historical" sense of our past or "technological" calculatioe. 
for our future . "Scarcity" has been overcome not through our unparallel~ 
productivity, but by purging ourselves of those human desi res Which 
brought scarcity into being. The ultimate scarcity is scarcity of time, and 
this scarcity can be overcome by beings which are really morta l only by los. 
ing consciousness of the fact of their mortality or at least of its 
significance. •3 
We have freed ourselves from the materialist's self-conscious 
"knowledge" that his own death is the ultimate evil. We resemb le Socrates 
in our ignorance concerning the nature of death, and we resemble the 
"Stoic" in our freedom from the fear generated through pre occupation 
with the fate of our bodies." Hence our leisure resembles that of the 
aristocrat in its freedom from materialistic necessity and in its forgetfulness 
of the significance of our dependence on our bodies and on othe r beings. It 
lacks, of course, the aristocrat's consciousness of his own human 
excellence." 
Marxism, critical theory (the Frankfurt School, particular ly Herben 
Marcuse), and behaviorial or behavorist social science all follow Rousseau 
in criticizing the technological view of the world and its human prod-
uct-the fearful bourgeois individual-with reference to a project to 
eliminate human self-consciousness or, in other words, to bring history to 
an end . For Rousseau, the disappearance of self-consciousness points to the 
apparently austere and lazy existence of beings which are easi ly satisfied. 
For critical theorists, the disappearance of self-consciousness mean s the end 
to repression or sublimation. There will no longer be any reaso n to defer im-
mediate gratification of bodily eros. Losing ourselves in this eros will 
somehow be both the cause and effect of our overcoming of time's 
scarcity. 46 
Rousseau is more consistent than the critical theorists in seeing that the 
disappearance of self-consciousness will radically simplify the poly-
morphous character of human eros. Even human sexual respo nse owes its 
distinctiveness to the fact that it cannot help but be affec ted by the 
phenomenon of self-consciousness." But contemporary radica ls are more 
effectually moved by critical theory's promise that it is possible to retain the 
joys of human self-indulgence while losing the "alienation" of human self-
consciousness. It promises that at the end of history universa l leisure or 
freedom from necessity will somehow be human leisure, forgetti ng or ignor-
ing that this promise is inconsistent with the homogeneous mate rialism on 
which the Marxiam idea of the end of history is based. Similar ly, the attrac-
tiveness of contemporary radica lism to the intellectual as an ideal is only 
possible because he does not recognize that everything that makes an in-
tellectual happy-art, philosophy, literature, and so forth-wi ll also disap-
pear with the end of history. As Alexandre Kojeve, the indivi dual who in 
our time has thought through most thoroughly what the end of history 
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uld mean, observes, "post-historical animals of the species Homo 
wo ;ens (which will live amidst abundance and complete security)" will 
;~~nstruct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and 
ciders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of 
/ogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love 
r b t " 0 !'ke adult eas s. 1 
The beast is wholly an animal. Consequently, he should not be confused 
'th Nietzsche's "last man" or Tocqueville's "gentle, peaceful" WI 
lave-both of whom still display residual humanity in their total domina-
ion by bourgeois fear. An animal is really content; his fear is merely in-
t unctive and momentary and not an essential part of his being. Everything 
the "last man" wants-freedom from fear, suffering, and toil-the animal 
actually possesses in a self-sufficient way. He can really enjoy leisure. 
Although socialist intellectuals and political leaders are dissatisfied 
with their own and humanity's present condition, they do not, as we have 
aid, view themselves as destroying humanity itself. They themselves are 
dominated, in a way even greater than the capitalist entrepreneur, by 
aristocratic pride. They have devoted their lives to activities which are 
characteristically understood as special opportunities to manifest one's own 
freedom from materialistic necessity. Accepting the truth of technology's 
homogeneous materialism, however, they also need visible and tangible 
evidence of their excellence. Consequently, they must successfully pursue 
the concrete actualization of an ideal which is consistent with the truth of 
homogeneous materialism. They see the self-contentment of aristocratic 
lei ure as a parasitic illusion based on the unjustifiable enslavement of be-
ing essentially no different from themselves. They have no right not to be 
"productive," to change the world in the service of human need 
democratically and materialistically conceived. 
As we have seen, the only ideal really consistent with technology's 
homogeneous materialism is the destruction of human distinctiveness and 
the reintegration of humanity into "brute" nature, which is the "end of 
hi tory." The socialist thinker characteristically hides this truth from 
himself, at least to some extent, because he does not want to deny his own 
humanity. Why should he heroically risk his life to create a world in which 
heroism could not be recognized? Why should he "apply" his thoughts to 
create a world in which there would be no self-conscious thought? Hence he 
u ually understands himself as engaged in quasi-Christian quest to univer-
salize human dignity, forgetting that dignity will always be a problem 
whenever there is consciousness of one's own mortality and where there is 
no such consciousness there can be no human dignity. The socialist intellec-
tual really resembles the capitalist entrepreneur in his immersion in a 
"selfish" illusion which really stands in opposition to both aristocratic 
leisure and the leisure he is working to create. The aristocrat would say that 
he, too, is unable to regard himself as a human being. His problem is not ex-
cessive pride but an insufficient appreciation of his genuine self-worth. 
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It is remarkably difficult to distinguish the prideful materi alism of th 
social scientist from that of the socialist intellectual. They share the sa e 
task: the transformation of human beings into docile, cooperative , " spec~e 
beings" which will be wholly content with their environment. While t: 
socialist intellectual acknowledges the need to use revolutionary terror, the 
social scientist holds that the task can be completed through the proper u e 
of persuasion. The social scientist is accused by the Marxist of being blind~ 
naive concerning the sternness of political life, and he replies that there t 
much evidence in our time that things are progressing his way. s 
The social scientist diffuses the view that human freedom and dignity 
are illusions, that there is no distinction between human and non-human 
nature, that homogenous materialism is wholly true. In this way, he 
prepares the world to accept social conditioning based on his technological 
expertise. He will eradicate poverty, misery, and other socia l problems by 
purging humanity of the illusions which generate pride, aggressiv eness, and 
competitiveness, or, more generally, individuality. Like the socia list, he will 
eliminate privacy in the name of social harmony, but he will do it in a 
peaceful, "evolutionary" manner. He will abolish humanity in the name of 
a herd-like contentment which resembles leisure, but its slavish dependence 
on a socialist or social scientific bureaucracy makes it somethi ng different 
from leisure. 49 
The social scientist in his pride exempts himself from his ho mogeneous 
materialism, although he has no coherent argument for why he can do so. 
By reducing human beings to brutes which can be controlled by him the way 
a shepherd contols his flock, he has, in a way, turned himse lf into a god. 
But is the manipulation of thoughtless and will-less beings in tas k worthy of 
a god or even of a genuinely human being? Like the socialist, the social 
scientist strives to create a world in which he will have no place to manife t 
his excellence. Eventually, he must come to realize that his dest ruction of 
humanity necessarily includes his own humanity . At best he will be bored, 
at worst he will fall into profound despair. He will not experience the self-
contentment which is the foundation of leisure. 
We have yet to account for those who accept the technolog ical view of 
reason and still oppose the destruction of humanity. Here it is easy to point 
to Nazism, Fascism, and certain variants of existentialism. The grandfather 
of all these movements is Nietzsche, who attempted the noble but probabl y 
impossible task of giving modern materialism an aristocratic interpretation. 
The history of reason, Nietzsche argues, with Marx (and perha ps Hegel), i 
the history of the progressive destruction of the "aristocratic" illusions 
which make humanity possible. The progressive unfo lding of the 
technological view of the world shows that the Socratic quest for rational 
self-knowledge necessarily culminates in the experience of nihi lism . io 
Nihilism is the mood or view in which nothing matters beca use there i 
no support for the distinctions which give human life meaning-s uch as the 
ones between good and evil and noble and base. If rati onal self-
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nsciousness is equivalent to nihilism, Nietzsche asserts, then one must 
co · . If h . bordinate reason to mstmct. one wants to oppose umamty's "ra-
~nal" project of self-distruction, then one must find a foundation for 
11 istocratic distinctions in physiological phenomena. "Homogeneous" 
araterialism must be replaced by "aristocratic" materialism. If the death of 
~od means that man can no longer exist as a being "inbetween" beast and 
d then he must will to become more than man-a superman. go' ietzsche, of course, cannot give a logos for why he opposes man's 
brutalization in this way. He cannot say why anything should matter to 
orneone who has experienced nihilism, or, what is the same thing, the full 
ignificance of the death of God. Because he lacks such a logos, his project 
ornes to sight as pure spiritedness or will. Part of its "effectual truth" will 
be to motivate blindly fanatic warriors-not aristocrats properly 
understood . To go down fighting freely and fiercely is man's final revenge 
against the nihilism of self-consciousness; "man will rather will nothingness 
than not will at all." " 
Because Nietzsche opposes the nihilism he sees in both Socratic self-
onsciousness and bestial self-contentment, then, he sees man as essentially 
a courageous but not a thoughtful being. In so doing, he opposed the 
possiblity of human leisure. The leisure of the aristocratic philosopher and 
the Christian are based on lies which are now incredible. The leisure of the 
beast is not worthy of human beings. 
ietzsche is superior to his socialist and social scientific adversaries in 
hi candid acknowledgment of his pride and his partisanship on behalf of 
hi own excellence. Consequently, he asserts that he will not accept a world 
in which a man like himself could not exist. He, however, shares the in-
coherence of his materialistic adversaries because he cannot articulate why 
hi pride does and should exist within the materialistic perspective he ac-
cepts as true. 
Consider that the unintentional but real product of Nietzsche's 
teaching, National Socialism, bases its aristocratic assertiveness on "scien-
tific racism" -a monstrous combination of aristocratic pride and modern 
materialism which, in a vulgarly Nietzschean manner, claims to discern 
humanly relevant distinctions in physiological phenomena. National 
ocialism, of course, is a distortion of Nietzsche's teaching, but one which 
eems inevitable in view of the incoherence and obscurity of his own 
aristocratic alternative. Because of its continuing attachment to "scientific" 
tandards, National Socialism was destined to fail as a project to destroy the 
tyranny of technology's homogeneous materialism. 52 Nevertheless, its con-
tant and unprecedently destructive motion was a sign of its fanatic opposi-
tion to the nihilism inherent in the technological understanding of "free 
time." 
What links Nietzsche together with his modern opponents is his conclu-
sion that the technological view of truth is true. What is rational can be 
determined only according to the "empirical" criterion of visible and tangi-
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ble evidence. Consequently, human reality is nothing other th an histo 
that is, what human beings have made. If realism is equiva lent 7• 
historicism, then there is no possiblity of human leisure. Yet this possibilit 0 
as we have seen, must be available if we are to be satisfied with our humani~• 
and hence if we are to control by transcending the monstrous creations 0~ 
technological thought. It would be foolish and futile to attempt to ove 
r-
come technology by destroying its useful products, but it is essenti al to how 
how these products can contribute to living a purposeful or complet 
human life. Otherwise we will continue to attempt to lose ourselves corn~ 
pletely in materialistic economic, social and political projects to destroy the 
source of our dissatisfaction. 
We have no choice but to question the view that the techno logical view 
is a complete view of the world. Even if we doubt our ability to change our 
world, we still have ourselves to consider. There are no doubt many ways of 
undertaking this project, but I will mention only two. We can join Stanley 
Jaki and others in pursuing the possibility that recent deve lopments in 
"cosmological" studies really do not supijort the technological conception 
of a homogeneous, infinite universe . Perhaps there is growing evidence for 
the Aristotelian or Christian view that the world exists for and even wa 
made for man, and we need not understand ourselves as ceaseless ly striving 
to establish our humanity in a wholly hostile environment. Realism may be 
something other than historicism. 53 
We can also, in a more "anthropological" fashion, attem pt to show 
that the technological view that death is the greatest evil for human being 
(who are essentially bodies in motion) is not true . This is possib le, I think, 
without affirming what seems to be the inhuman and incredib le Socratic 
view that fear of death is unreasonable because we know nothing certain 
about it. We know enough to suppose that death is in some sense an evil 
unless supernatural salvation is available. Without consciousness of our 
mortality, however, we would not be human beings, and we have presented 
ample evidence of our great-if perhaps unreasonable-attachm ent to our 
humanity. If "humanity" can be conceived as the greatest good for human 
beings, then surely death is an acceptable evil. 5• Only at this point can we af-
firm the goodness of the technological product of "free time": freedom 
from necessity is only good if it is freedom for human beings. 
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